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This paper studies the eﬀects of product and labour market deregulation on
wage inequality and welfare. By constructing an analytically tractable model in
which the level of product market competition and the wages are endogenously
distributed, I show that even though deregulation in labour markets raises the
aggregate level of employment and the average real wage, the welfare of trade
unions may decrease in sectors with a low level of competition. Moreover, re-
moving barriers to entry in the goods market has mixed eﬀects on inequality: the
wage variance and the Gini index are lower, but the ratio of the highest over the
lowest wage paid in the economy increases. Finally, an interesting result of the
model concerns the wage density function. By parameterizing the rates of ﬁrms
creation and destruction on the basis of Belgian data, the resulting shape of the
wage distribution exhibits an empirically accurate form, unimodal and positively
skewed.
Keywords: product market competition; wage distribution; barriers to entry.
JEL codes: E24, J5, L16
∗I am indebted to Fabien Postel-Vinay for several insightful and helpful conversations. I also bene-
ﬁted from discussions with Aleksander Berentsen, Etienne Lehmann, Amina Mahdi, Henri Sneessens,
John Sutton, and Bruno Van der Linden. I want to thank the participants to the DMMG conference
in the University of Algarve, the IZA Workshop on Matching Frictions, and the EALE conference in
Amsterdam for valuable insights. A grant of the Belgian National Bank is gratefully acknowledged .
†DIEM, University of Genoa, Italy. E-mail : cardullo@economia.unige.it.
11 Introduction
Although most of the theoretical and empirical literature stresses the positive eﬀects
of product and labour market deregulation on employment and the real wage, the
implementation of such policies faces in many cases and in many countries the vehement
opposition of lobbies, interests groups, unions, and simple citizens. The aim of this
paper is to oﬀer an interpretation for these apparently conﬂicting facts.
The issue may be put in these terms. First, the call for less restrictions in product
and labour markets has a sounding theoretical rationale. As Blanchard and Giavazzi
(2003), Carlin and Soskice (2006), and Ebell and Haefke (2009) clearly spell out, remov-
ing barriers to operate in product markets entails more competition, a lower mark-up
that can be chosen by each single producer, and larger output. This in turn raises
labour demand. Real wages are higher both because of the increased demand and
because ﬁercer competition also reduces the price of the consumption goods. A posi-
tive shift of labour demand may also spur from a less regulated labour market, if the
employment protection schemes are so tight to dampen ﬁrms’ incentive to hire workers.
Recent empirical studies conﬁrm these theoretical predictions. For the OECD
(2006), liberalization in goods market is one decisive factor that helps to explain why
some countries (Ireland, Austria, Scandinavia, and the Netherlands) experience high
employment rates even though their labour markets remain very regulated. Nicoletti
and Scarpetta (2005), Griﬃth et al. (2007), and Fiori et al. (2008) also conﬁrm the
beneﬁcial eﬀects on employment and the real wage of product market deregulation in
some OECD countries 1.
But then a natural question arises: if deregulation is such a panacea both for the
unemployed (since it raises the employment) and for the employees (for the real wage
increases), why do so many citizens look at these reforms with diﬃdence or hostility?
There is plenty of evidence that conﬁrms such a negative mood. According to the
Eurobarometer (2008) (a survey conducted in Europem on a regular basis), 43% of
the European citizens dislike free trade originated by the globalization because it is
considered a threat for their jobs and for the incumbent ﬁrms. Another signiﬁcant
1Griﬃth et al. (2007) and Fiori et al. (2008) also show that the positive impact of a more
deregulated product market on employment is greater the more regulated is the labour market or the
stronger the workers’ bargaining power.
2example is the recent (late 2007) choice made by the European governments not to
include in the Lisbon Treaty the text relating to free and undistorted competition
present the Principles of of the European Community since the Treaty of Rome of
1956.2
Several arguments can be brought to explain this attitude. For instance, some of
the beneﬁts that deregulation may deliver are not immediate or diﬃcult to perceive,
at least ex ante3. Or it may simply be a natural tendency towards the maintenance of
the status quo, as Boeri et al. (2001) document in an analysis of a survey about the
Europeans’ attitude with respect to their welfare state4.
In this paper I oﬀer an alternative view. Workers’ (more precisely, trade unions’)
diﬃdence may stem from the fact that such policies may reduce their welfare even
though they have a positive impact on the average real wage and the level of employ-
ment. Moreover, product market deregulation also has mixed eﬀects on inequality.
These results are obtained by constructing an analytically tractable model that
incorporates two distinctive features: (i) the level of competition is not the same in
each sector of the economy and (ii) it varies according to an endogenous stochastic
process5. The economy is composed by a large number of intermediate goods sectors,
identical ex ante and in which ﬁrms compete ` a la Cournot; the ﬁnal consumption good
is produced in a competitive market. As respects to labour market, unions of ﬁrms
and workers bargain over the wage at sectoral level. The creation and the destruction
of ﬁrms in each intermediate market follow a continuous-time Markov Chain. A new
ﬁrm enters the sector at a certain rate, determined by a zero-proﬁt condition in entry
behaviour. In addition, at a certain exogenous rate, an incumbent ﬁrm exits the
sector. At the steady-state equilibrium, the level of competition (i.e. the number of
2Such a reference has been moved to Protocol 6 “On the Internal Market and Competition”.
3For instance, some workers may focus only on nominal wage variations and neglect the positive
changes in the real wage caused by some income eﬀect that makes the consumption goods cheaper.
4One could also emphasize the active intervention of lobbies and interest groups that try to inﬂuence
the public opinion by giving more weight to the risks of the reforms and less to the their opportunities.
5These are also the crucial diﬀerences with respect to the previous literature on the interactions
between product and labour market (for instance, Blanchard and Giavazzi, 2003; or Ebell and Hae-
fke, 2009 ) that modeled an economy with monopolistic competition in which, at the equilibrium,
each sector is indistinguishable from the others and the degree of competition takes an endogenous
deterministic value.
3ﬁrms competing), the real wage, and the level of employment are not the same among
the intermediate markets but follow an endogenous distribution.
Comparative static results conﬁrm that a reduction in the cost of entry in the
product market or a decrease in the bargaining power of workers’ unions raises the
aggregate level of employment and the real wage6. Yet, squeezing entry costs has
ambiguous eﬀects on inequality too. On the one hand, it allows the existence of sectors
with stronger competition7, in which the rents extracted by workers under the form of
wages are low. These low-paid jobs widen the distance between the highest and the
lowest wages in the economy. On the other hand, since competition gets tougher, more
workers are employed in sectors with many ﬁrms, implying that more employees earn
the same wage. As numerical simulations show, the wage variance and the Gini index
decrease8.
Numerical results also allow to assess the impact of these reforms on the welfare of
the unions of workers. While product market reforms enhance the expected utility of
all workers, the eﬀects of labour market deregulation vary with the level of competition
of the market. Unions operating in sectors with low competition are worse oﬀ, whereas
those working in more competitive markets beneﬁt from the labour market deregula-
tion. The reason is that a reduction in the bargaining power of workers’ unions raises
employment and the real wage but also makes more likely the entry of new ﬁrms in the
future. In low competitive sectors the capital loss the incumbents incur when a new
ﬁrm enters the market is so high to outweigh the positive employment and real wage
eﬀects.
Finally, an interesting feature of the model concerns the wage distribution. Identi-
cal workers earn diﬀerent salaries only because they operate in sectors with diﬀerent
degrees of product market competition. By parameterizing the rates of creation and
6More precisely, the eﬀects of a lower bargaining power of workers’ unions on the real wage are
ambiguous at comparative statics level but result slightly positive in the numerical simulations.
7For the free entry condition, the expected costs of entry are equal to the expected proﬁts. If
costs are high, proﬁts must be high as well, meaning that sectors cannot aﬀord a too ﬁerce degree of
competition.
8The relationship between product market competition and wage inequality has been studied by
Guadalupe (2007). The underlying theoretical mechanism is diﬀerent however. More competition
makes ﬁrms eager to hire high-skilled workers that are more capable to produce at lower costs. So the
returns to skill increase, widening wage inequality.
4destruction of ﬁrms on the basis of Belgian data, I get a wage distribution of empir-
ically accurate shape: unimodal and positively skewed. Without the pretension to
consider competition in goods market the main source of earnings inequality, I think
however that this result is an useful piece of information that helps to understand the
well-known characteristics of the wage density functions in most Western countries.
The structure of the paper is the following. Section 2 and 3 illustrate the model
and the steady-state equilibrium. Section 4 presents the comparative static results.
Section 5 shows the numerical simulations. Section 6 concludes.
2 The model
2.1 Preferences and technology
I consider an economy with one ﬁnal consumption good and a large integer number I of
intermediate goods. The ﬁnal good market is perfectly competitive, whereas Cournot
competition is assumed within each intermediate sector. The ﬁnal good production












in which Qi is the amount of intermediate good i used by the production process of
the ﬁnal good and s > 1 to allow a situation in which some Qi are equal to zero. Cost




















P is the price index. Parameter s is the elasticity of the demand for good i.
Time is continuous. In each intermediate sector there is a measure normalized
to 1 of workers; they can be employed only in that industry, so there are I perfectly
5segmented labour markets9. The number of ﬁrms competing in each intermediate sector
follows a Markov chain that will be described in the next section. The intermediate
ﬁrm production function is identical in each sector and is given by lj,i, the labour input
for ﬁrm j in sector i. The total amount of good i produced is therefore equal to the
level of employment in that sector and is denoted by Qi =
 
j li,j.
In each intermediate sector unions of workers and ﬁrms bargain over the wage.
Workers’ unions enjoy an instantaneous utility equal to wi ·
 







with wi and z respectively being the real wage paid in sector i and the value of home
production. The instantaneous utility of the unions of ﬁrms is given by the sum of
each ﬁrm’s proﬁts. The wage is bargained by the unions of ﬁrms and workers at a
sectoral level. Conditional on the results of such a negotiation, any competitor decides
the optimal level of the labour input to operate in the market.
A crucial assumption of the paper is that the the value of what is produced at
home by the unemployed is a fraction of the total market output: z = α · Y , with
0 < α < 1. The motivation is twofold. First, as we will see later on, such an
assumption allows to have in relatively simple way an income eﬀect on workers’ utility.
Second, it is important for an accurate analysis of their welfare changes in response
to some product and labour market policies. If the income of the unemployed was
unaﬀected by Y , any intervention that raises the output of the ﬁnal good and reduce
its price would not have any impact on their instantaneous utility10.
2.2 The Stochastic Environment
The creation and destruction of ﬁrms in each intermediate market i follows a continuous
time Markov chain that takes values in the set L = {0,1,2,...L}, L being the maximum
number of ﬁrms that can compete in a sector. I assume that in small interval of time
dt at most one ﬁrm can enter or leave a sector. So, if xi is the number of ﬁrms active in
9The assumption of perfect segmentation in the labour markets is essentially done for tractability
reasons. Still, one can think that the tasks and abilities required for a job are so diﬀerent among
intermediate sectors that workers cannot switch from one market to another.
10Due to lack of times series data for home production, it is diﬃcult to have a clear view on its
relationship with market output. Recent studies (Blankenau and Kose, 2006) do not ﬁnd a clear
correlation between home production and GDP while suggesting that the former may be more volatile
than the latter. The assumption of α constant is done only for simplicity reasons.
6Figure 1: Creation and destruction of ﬁrms. In bold the endogenous variables.
sector i, there is a probability mxi dt that a new ﬁrm enters and a probability δ · xi dt
that one ﬁrm exits (see Figure 1)11.
I impose mxi = q · Vxi, with Vxi being the number of ﬁrms that want to enter
in sector i when there are already x incumbents. At x = L, ﬁrms have no incentive
to enter the market and mL = 0. Both Vxi ∀xi ∈ [1,2,...L] and L are endogenously
determined by zero proﬁt conditions in entry behaviour. As it will be more clear later
on, for simplicity reasons I ﬁnd convenient to impose m0 as a constant.
Since intermediate sectors are identical ex-ante - they have the same level of labour
force, the same preferences, and technology - the subscript i can be removed. Let
πx,t be the probability that a time t there are x active ﬁrms in a generic intermediate
market. Then:
πx,t+dt = [1 − δ · xdt − mxdt] · πx,t + mx−1dt · πx−1,t
+ δ · (x + 1)dt · πx+1,t ∀x ∈ [1,2,...,L − 1],
πL,t+dt = [1 − δ · Ldt] · πL,t + mL−1dt · πL−1,t
π0,t+dt = [1 − m0dt] · π0,t + δdt · π1,t.
The steady-state probability distribution is such that πx,t+dt = πx,t, ∀t. Expressing πx




· πx−1 with x ∈ [1,2,.,L], (3)
11This Markov chain is called a birth-death process. See Taylor and Karlin (1998) for details.






































The probability πx that in one intermediate sector there are x ﬁrms competing
in the market depends on δ and the endogenous values L and mn = q · Vn ∀n ∈
[0, 1, 2,...L − 1].
With I is suﬃciently large, I can apply the law of large numbers and deﬁne the




lx · x · πx · I. (5)
2.3 Wage determination
In each intermediate sector, unions of ﬁrms and workers bargain over the wage. Such
an assumption seems plausible for many countries in Continental Europe, where the
sectoral level of negotiation often plays a major role12.
Let r be the discount rate common to all agents. The expected discounted utility
of the unions of workers is:
rUW(x) = wx · lx · x + α · Y · (1 − lx · x) + mx [UW(x + 1) − UW(x)]
+ δ · x[UW(x − 1) − UW(x)],
(6)
with x ∈ [0,1,...,L]. Operating as a union of workers in market with x ﬁrms is like
holding an asset that pays you a dividend equal to the sum of the wages paid to the
employees and the income earned by the unemployed. The underlying assumption is
that the trade union behaves in a utilitarian way, caring about the sum of members’
incomes. At certain rates, the level of competition may decrease or increase by one
12In Belgium, the country chosen as a target for the calibration of the model, the sectoral level is
predominant, even if in recent years new agreements have taken place. See Brock and Dobbelaere
(2006).
8unit, modifying the asset value to UW(x−1) and UW(x+1). The expected discounted
utility of a union of ﬁrms is:
rUF(x) = x[p(Qx)lx − wxlx ] + mx [UF(x + 1) − UF(x)]
+ δ · x[UF(x − 1) − UF(x)] ,
(7)
with x ∈ [1,2,..L]. Function p(Qx) is expressed in (2) and represents the price of
the intermediate good when x ﬁrms are competing in the market. The instantaneous
utility of the union of ﬁrms is is given by the sum of the revenues of each ﬁrm.
I consider an axiomatic Nash solution. The threat points for the unions of ﬁrms
and workers are denoted respectively by ¯ UF and ¯ UV:
r ¯ UF = 0. (8)
r ¯ UW = α · Y. (9)
If no agreement is concluded, the employees in that sector do not work and and earn
the same fraction of the consumption good of the unemployed workers. The ﬁrm does
not produce and does not pay any wage13. The real wage received by the employees in
a sector with x active ﬁrms solve the problem:
wx = argmax
 
UW(x) − ¯ UW
 β  
UF(x) − ¯ UF
 1−β
s.t.
UW(x) > ¯ UW
UF(x) > ¯ UF withx ∈ [1,2,..L].
(10)
The constraints imposed in the maximization mean that both parties have always the
possibility to abandon the negotiation if this choice makes them better oﬀ. I assume, as
Rosen (1997) and Hall and Milgrom (2006) do, that such constraints are not binding:
no player has an incentive to quit the negotiation and this holds for any value of x.
Computing the F.O.C. and using (6), (7),(8), and (9) yields :
wx = β p(Qx) + (1 − β)α · Y ∀x ∈ [1,2,...,L]. (11)
13Such threats points are similar to those introduced by Rosen (1997) and Hall and Milgrom (2008).
The idea is that a disagreement in the negotiation between unions usually implies a delay in the
production, strikes, not massive lay-oﬀs or quits. Actually, in the paper of Hall and Milgrom, the
delay in the production involves a ﬂow cost for the ﬁrm. For simplicity, I impose it equal to zero.
9This equation has a straightforward interpretation. The wage is a weighted average of
the total revenues obtained in the intermediate sector (p(Qx)lx) and the opportunity
cost of employment (α·Y ). The weights are given by the bargaining power of workers
and ﬁrms, β and 1 − β. If the union of workers has no bargaining power, each employee
receives an instantaneous utility from being employed exactly equal to α · Y . On the
other hand, when β = 1, all the proﬁts earned in the market accrue to the employee.
In this limit case, ﬁrms cannot recoup the entry costs and nobody is willing to enter a
market.
2.4 The Cournot game
Conditional on the wage equation (11), at each point in time, a ﬁrm decides the optimal
level of labour input to play the Cournot game. The expected lifetime income for a
ﬁrm producing in a market with x − 1 competitors solves the following problem:
rJE(x) = max
lx
p(Qx)lx − wxlx + δ(x − 1)[JE(x − 1) − JE(x)]
+ mx [JE(x + 1) − JE(x)] − δJE(x)
s.t. wx = β p(Qx) + (1 − β)α · Y
(12)
Operating in a such a sector pays you a dividend of p(Qx)lx−wxlx, the revenues net of
the wage bill. At a rate δ ·(x−1), one of the competitors exits the market, implying a
shift in the asset value from JE(x−1) to JE(x), while at a rate mx, the number of ﬁrms
active in the market increases by one unit and the new value function is JE(x + 1).
Finally, at a rate δ the ﬁrm itself exits the market, experiencing a capital loss equal to
−JE(x).14
The F.O.C. of the problem is:








The second line in (13) is obtained by using equation (2). Equation (13) is a standard
solution of a x−players Cournot game. Each ﬁrm maximizes its surplus, given the
14This is tantamount to saying that the expected discounted utility of a ﬁrm that is outside the
market is equal to zero.
10optimal strategy of the other players. In equilibrium, the marginal revenue of a ﬁrm
must be equal to the marginal utility of unemployment15. Notice also that from a
single ﬁrm’s viewpoint the total amount of the ﬁnal good, Y , is given. This is due to
the fact that, with I large enough, a single ﬁrm’s decision has an impact only within
each sector but does not aﬀect the price index P and quantity Y .
Since all the ﬁrms in the same sector hire the same level of labour input, Qx = x·lx.










∀x ∈ [1,2,...,L]. (14)
By using equation (13), I can write the wage equation as a function of Y only:
wx = α · Y ·
β + x · s − 1
x · s − 1
∀x ∈ [1,2,...,L]. (15)
Finally, using (11) and (13), ﬁrms’revenues can be written as
p(Qx)lx − wxlx = (1 − β)α · Y
lx
xs − 1
∀x ∈ [1,2,...,L]. (16)
2.5 Zero-proﬁt condition
Entering a market is a costly activity that requires time. Each ﬁrm deciding to compete
in a sector with x incumbents must pay a ﬂow cost h
x+1 until it enters the market16. The
assumption of a cost decreasing in the level of competition seems plausible (it involves
more eﬀort to break a monopoly than entering a very competitive sector) and allows to
have a ﬁnite number of potential entrants for each level of competition x ∈ [0,1,...,L].17




+ q[JE(x + 1) − JV(x)]
+ [mx − q][JV(x + 1) − JV(x)] + δ · x[JV(x − 1) − JV(x)],
(17)
15Diﬀerentiating the ﬁrst line of equation (13) with respect to lx, I obtain [p′′(Qx)lx + 2p′(Qx)] that
is negative if 1+s
s < 2x. This is always true for any x ≥ 1 and s > 1.
16This way of structuring ﬁrms’ entry is the same used in an equilibrium matching framework ` a la
Pissarides (2000) to model the posting of a job vacancy.
17If the expected cost of entering a market was the same for any x, ﬁrms would only try to produce
in sectors with no competition, x = 0, because they ensure the highest expected proﬁts.
11with x ∈ [0,1,...L − 1].
To ﬁnd Vx, the number of ﬁrms that want to enter a market with x competitors, I
introduce a zero-proﬁt condition. Firms enter one intermediate market as long as the
expected return is nonnegative:
rJV(x) = 0 ∀x ∈ [0,1,..L − 1] (18)
From (12), the expected discounted value of a ﬁrm with x competitors must be equal
to the expected cost of entry:
JE(x + 1) =
h
q · (x + 1)
∀x ∈ [0,1,2,..L − 1] (19)






(1 − β)α · Y
lx · x
xs − 1
− r ∀x ∈ [1,2,..L]. (20)
Conditional on Y , the rate mx at which the number of active ﬁrms shifts from x to
x + 1 decreases with β and h, two parameters capturing respectively the intensity of
regulation in the labour and product markets18.
In Appendix A, I show that there exists a ﬁnite number of incumbents L such that
no one wants to enter that sector anymore and mL = 0.19 Thus, evaluating both (14)














18Diﬀerently from a standard search and matching framework, in this model there are no congestion
eﬀects, because each ﬁrm faces a constant entry rate, q, that is not aﬀected by the number of potential
entrants. In fact, a high value for mx = q · Vx has a negative impact not on the entrants but on the
incumbents, since it raises the probability that a new competitor will arrive; for instance, the higher
m1 is, the shorter will be the period the incumbent can enjoy its monopolist rent. If there are too
many entrants at x = 1, the monopolist’ expected revenues are not high enough to repay the cost
of entry, and the expected discounted value rJE(1) is negative. In turn, this implies that rJE(2) is
also negative, so no additional ﬁrm will enter a market with x = 1. This also explains why I need
to impose m0 exogenous: at x = 0 there are no incumbents, and the zero-proﬁt condition does not
apply.
19More correctly, L is an integer number such that the RHS of (20) is strictly positive when evaluated
at L − 1 and nonpositive at x = L. For simplicity reasons, I neglect this integer constraint. I take it
into account only in the numerical analysis.
12Substituting Y in equation (20) allows to make the rate mx depending only on one
endogenous variable, L:
mx
r · (x + 1)
=
L · s − 1






x · s − 1
L · s − 1
 s
− 1, (22)
with x ∈ [1,2,..L].20
3 Equilibrium
At the equilibrium, the amount of the ﬁnal good produced is not ﬁxed. Applying the
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Deﬁnition A long-run general equilibrium is deﬁned as a vector
[lx, wx, Vx, P(Qx)] ∀x ∈ [1,2,...,L], a probability distribution [π0,π1,π2,...,πL], and
a value Y of the ﬁnal good satisfying:
1. The F.O.C.s (15) of the bargaining problem, ∀x ∈ [1,2,...,L].
2. The Nash equilibrium (14) of the Cournot game.
3. The zero proﬁt conditions (22), ∀x ∈ [1,2,...,L].
4. The steady-state distribution (4).
5. The F.O.C. in the ﬁnal good sector (2) and the equation for Y in (23).





x · s − 1
 
x · s − 1
x
 s  
L









13The F.O.C.s (15) and the solutions of the Cournot game (14) are expressed as a function
of Y only. The zero proﬁts conditions (22) determine the values of Vx as a function of L.
Thus, the steady state distribution [π0, π1,...,πL] also depends on L only. Therefore,
the equilibrium of the model can be characterized by a system of two equations, (21)
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If a solution to this system exists, then the equilibrium values of Y and L uniquely
determine the value of the wage wx, the level of employment lx · x, the number of
potential entrants Vx, and the steady state distribution.
Proposition 1 If s ≥ 2, the system (24) has a unique positive solution in the space
(L,Y ). If 1 < s < 2, the system admits at least two solution in the space (L,Y ), one
at the origin.
Proof. See Appendix B.
3.1 Properties of the Distribution
Proposition 2 If m0 > δ, the steady-state distribution [π0,π1,π2,...,πL] is humped-
shaped.
Proof.
From equation (3) we know that πx+1 > πx ↔ mx/(x + 1) > δ. So imposing
m0 > δ implies that π1 > π0. From the zero proﬁt condition (20), one also gets
that
∆[mx/(x+1)]
∆x < 0.21 So mx/(x + 1) reaches the maximum at x = 1 and then it
monotonically decreases until it is equal to zero at x = L.
21Ignoring for a moment the integer problem, one gets
d[mx/(x + 1)]
dx
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14Figure 2: The endogenous distribution has an humped-shaped form.
Since π1 > π0, two cases are possible. If mx/(x + 1) < δ ∀x ∈ [1,2,...,L − 1],
then the maximum point of the distribution [π0,π1,π2,...,πL] is at x = 1 and then it
monotonically decreases.
Otherwise, the distribution is increasing as long as mx/(x + 1) > δ and decreases for
mx/(x + 1) ∈ [0, δ). Figure 2 shows it. In both cases, it is hump-shaped.
4 Deregulation in Products and Labour Markets
In this section I summarize the eﬀects of product and labour market deregulation
policies on employment and the real wage. I consider the parameter h, the ﬂow cost of
entry, as a proxy for the extent of the rigidity in the product market, and the bargaining
power of the unions of workers β as an indicator of the level of regulation present in the
labour market. Formally, I totally diﬀerentiate the system (24) and apply the implicit
function theorem. Computations are presented in Appendix C.
154.1 Reducing the entry cost
Employment eﬀects
Lowering the ﬂow cost of entry h makes more ﬁrms eager to enter the market for
each level of competition x. This in turn increases the rates mx at which the level
of competition increases in each sector. The maximum number of ﬁrms L that may
compete in each market also goes up, because a lower h decreases the expected cost of
entry. From equation (23), a higher L raises the amount of the ﬁnal good Y produced
in the economy: ﬁercer competition in the intermediate sectors augments the supply
of these goods to the ﬁnal representative ﬁrm.
Two countervailing eﬀects intervene on the aggregate level of employment, E. On
the one hand, a higher Y has a negative eﬀect on the sectoral level of employment lx·x
(see equation 14 ). This stems from the assumption that unemployed workers receive a
fraction α of the ﬁnal good Y . A larger amount of the ﬁnal good Y that accrues to the
unemployed workers raises the opportunity cost of employment and make them more
demanding in the wage negotiation. Higher wages discourage ﬁrms from hiring more
workers. Such negative income eﬀect tends to reduce the aggregate level of employment
as h goes down.
On the other hand, in the economy there are more sectors with stronger competi-
tion. Employment in each intermediate sector increases with competition (notice from
equation 14 that lx · x is increasing in x), so this distribution eﬀect tends to raise E.
In the Appendix C, I show that a reduction in entry costs raises the aggregate level of
employment: the distribution eﬀect is stronger than the negative income eﬀect.
Eﬀect on the real wage
As shown in equation (15), the real wage is aﬀected by a change in the entry cost only
via Y . A reduction in h raises the real wage for any level of x because it increases
the amount of the ﬁnal good going to the employees. However, this does not imply
that the average real wage, ¯ wx =
 L
x=1 wx xlx πx I, necessarily increases. The reason
is that there is also a distribution eﬀect going in the opposite direction. A reduction
in entry costs augments the likelihood of being employed in more competitive sectors,
where workers are paid less. It is impossible to say at the analytical level which of the
two eﬀect predominates.
164.2 Reducing unions’ bargaining power
Employment eﬀects
A decrease in the bargaining power of the unions of workers boosts the entry of new
ﬁrms in the product market, because potential employers know they will get a higher
fraction of the rents. Since expected proﬁts are higher for any level of competition x,
L also increases. The distribution [π0,π1,...,πL] shifts to the right: it is more likely to
be employed in competitive sectors.
As in the case of product market deregulation, two forces aﬀect the aggregate level
of employment. A lower β, by raising the amount of consumption good produced Y ,
increases workers’ opportunity cost of employment. This in turn reduces the level of
employment lx·x for any given level of competition. But the change in the distribution
outweighs this negative eﬀect and the aggregate level of employment E goes up.
Eﬀect on the real wage
A change in the unions’ bargaining power has a twofold eﬀect on the real wage. On the
one hand, lowering the share of the rents that go to the employees exerts a downward
pressure on the wage. On the other hand, a reduction in β raises the total amount
of the ﬁnal good produced in the economy, and the wage tends to appreciate in real
terms. The net eﬀect cannot be ascertained at the analytical level.
4.3 Distributive Eﬀects
What are the eﬀects of product and labour market deregulation on the probability
distribution? A ﬁrst assessment may be carried out by examining the ratio between





s − 1 + β
s − 1
·
L · s − 1
β + L · s − 1
This expression is increasing in L. The higher is the maximum number of ﬁrms that
can compete in a market, the wider the dispersion measured by this indicator. Since
a decrease in the entry costs h raises L, product market deregulation has the eﬀect of
enlarging the gap between the highest paid workers and the lowest paid ones. When
entry costs are high, only sectors with a low level competition can survive because
17Variables Interpretation Source
s measure of competition between sectors u about 8%
δ net destruction rate of a business INS (2000); (2001); (2002).
N labour force per sector imposing full employment at x = L + 1.
β trade unions’ bargaining power imposing wL/αY ∼ = 0.98.
r discount rate 5% on annual basis.
h/q expected cost of entry zero proﬁt equation (21)
α fraction of Y going to the unemployed lowest wage close to minimum wage.
Table 1. Values of the variables for calibration.
ﬁrms need huge proﬁts to repay them. So, deregulation in product markets allow the
existence of markets with ﬁercer competition, small proﬁts and low-paid jobs.
On the contrary, the consequences of a weakening of trade unions’ power cannot
be ascertained at the analytical level. A decrease in β has a twofold eﬀect on the ratio
w1/wL. The direct one - obtained by diﬀerentiating the ratio with L ﬁxed - is negative,
because a reduction in unions’ bargaining power has a stronger negative impact on the
wage earned by an employee in a monopoly compared to that earned by a worker in a
sector with L ﬁrms. So a lower β reduces the wage dispersion. However, a reduction
in β also enhances L, that in turn raises w1/wL. The complexity of the computations
do not permit to verify which eﬀect outnumbers the other.
The ratio w1/wL is only one possible measure of wage dispersion. For a fuller
account of the distributive eﬀects of product and labour market deregulation, it is
necessary to evaluate the eﬀects of a change in β and h on the whole distribution
[π0,π1,...,πL]. Unfortunately the computations are too cumbersome to be discerned
at the analytical level, so most of the results of the paper are obtained via numerical
simulations and will be presented in the next section.
185 Quantitative Results
5.1 Calibration
I take the month as unit of time. Data refer to the period 2002-2003 in Belgium. Table
1 summarizes my calibration procedure. The discount rate is ﬁxed at 0.004 (5% on an
annual basis). The maximum number of ﬁrms in each sector, L, is set equal to 15. It
may seem a small number. Recall however that ﬁrms compete both within each sector
- ` a la Cournot - and among sectors, the intensity of this competition depending on the
value of the elasticity s. Imposing L = 15 simply means that in the economy there are
at most 15 ﬁrms that produce exactly the same type of good, competing with others
companies that sell broadly similar items.
The ﬁrm’s destruction rate δ is inferred by looking at the number of Belgian ﬁrms
that lose each year their VAT code number 22. The Belgian Institute of Statistics
provide these data for the years 2000-2001-2002 (INS, 2000; 2001; 2002). The monthly
destruction rate is about 0.004 in all the three years23. The exogenous rate of entry
m0 is normalized to 1.
In the model, the labour force in each sector is exogenous and normalized to 1. In
the calibration, I impose that it is equal to the level of employment if L+1 ﬁrms were
producing in the sector; this implies that even when the level of competition is highest
(at x = L), there is still some frictional level of unemployment. This assumption
allows to have the unemployment rate as a function of s, δ, m0, L only.24 Since I have
22I rule out all the ﬁrms that declared no employees.
23The same source also provides the ﬁrms’ creation rate for the same years. It is about 0.0035,
suggesting that the stock of active ﬁrms was fairly stable in that period.












The total labour force in the economy is
N · I = (L + 1) · lL+1 · I = Y 1−sα−s
 
(L + 1)s
(L + 1)s − 1
 −s
· I.
Thus, the unemployment ratio u ≡ N I−E
N I depends only on L, s, m0, and δ, the last two parameters
appearing in the probability distribution πx.
19already attributed a value to the last three variables, I can ﬁnd s by imposing that the
unemployment rate should be close to 7/8%, the percentage that Belgium experienced
in the last ﬁve years. The corresponding value of s is 2.1.
In Belgium, the gross monthly minimum wage is 1387,49 euros; for a single employee
that works full-time the net salary is about 1100 euros. The unemployment beneﬁts
are generous: a single beneﬁciary may receive a subsidy up to 1144 euros per month.
So, to calibrate the bargaining power of workers’unions I impose that the ratio between
the lowest wage in the economy and the income of unemployed workers - that, by using
equation (15), is (L · s − 1)/(L · s − 1 + β) - is close to 1. With such a ratio equal to
0.98, β is 0.62. The number of sectors in the economy is ﬁxed to 2350. The parameter
α is obtained by imposing that wL ∼ = 1100 euros; the resulting value is 0.01.
Finally, the expected cost of entry h/q is inferred by imposing the zero proﬁt con-
dition (21). The resulting value is 143.79, a very tiny amount. This is because the
construction of the model is such that the expected proﬁts of a ﬁrm are small compared
to the wages.
5.1.1 Wage Distribution
An interesting result that stems from the calibration concerns the wage distribution.
By pinning down the variables δ,m0,s, and L only on the basis of employment data,
the resulting wage density function wx → lx · x · πx ∀x is unimodal and positively
skewed, just as the earning distributions observed in the data of most countries (see
Figure 3).
Why does the wage density function have such a shape? The unimodal property
depends on the structure of the probability distribution [π0,π1,...,πL], proved in Propo-
sition 2. The positive skewness property stems from the convexity of the wage function
(15) with respect to x.25 The wage loss caused by an increase in competition is larger
the more oligopolistic is the sector. While workers employed in sectors with L − 1,
L−2, L−3 competitors earn broadly the same salary, the diﬀerence between the wage
of the employee of a monopolist and that of duopolist is much wider. So, most of the
earnings are concentrated on the left tail of the distribution.
25If we ignore the integer problem, this can be easily seen by computing the second derivative of
wx with respect to x and noting that is positive.
20Figure 3: Above: Wage distribution wx → lx · x · πx for x ∈ [1,2,...,L]. Below:
distribution of workers per level of competition x → lx · x · πx for x ∈ [1,2,...,L].
What the model is not able to capture is the large diﬀerences in absolute value
between the richest and the poorest. The Gini index resulting from the calibration is
very low, about 0.009. The obvious explanation for that is the lack in the model of
most of the features that explain most of the income inequality in the industrialized
countries, such as rents and revenues coming from the overall wealth of the individuals.
An additional reason stems from the wage equation, that is not convex enough in x to
display a large diﬀerence between the highest wages and the lowest ones.
5.2 Simulation Results
5.2.1 Lowering entry costs
I consider a reduction up to 25% in the expected costs of entry in the labour market,
h/q. Figure 4 summarizes the main results. The maximum number of ﬁrms that may
21Figure 4: Numerical results: a reduction in the expected entry costs, h/q. Dotted lines:
simulation with h/q 25% lower.
compete shifts from 15 to 20, and the output Y is raised by 1.8%. The unemployment
rate decreases up to 1.5 percentage points. The average real wage goes up, but very
slightly: the salary gain is about 8 euros, that corresponds to a 0.7% increase. Such a
tiny improvement depends on the two potentially oﬀsetting eﬀects mentioned in section
4.1, the positive income eﬀect and the negative distribution eﬀect. The small increase
in ¯ wx means that the former slightly outnumbers the latter.
Inequality
Lower entry costs also aﬀect the steady state distributions. The consequences in terms
22of wage inequality are mixed. On the one hand, we know from section 4.3 that the ratio
between the highest and the lowest wage, w1/wL, increases. However, the numerical
results show that diminishing h/q lowers the wage variance and the Gini index26. The
decline in the variance is considerable: once h/q is reduced by 25%, it plummets from
297.3 to 96.3 euros, about 68% lower. The Gini index also shrinks by about 39%.
How can such diﬀerent results be explained? Tougher competition in the product
market lowers the variance and the Gini index because there are now more workers
employed in sectors with many ﬁrms, that implies more employees earning the same
wage. So, the fact that the distance between the highest and the lowest wage paid in
the economy widens does not entail an overall increase in wage inequality.
Welfare of trade unions
Decreasing the entry costs also has non trivial eﬀects on the expected utility of a
worker’s union, rUW(x). Again, the presence of a negative distribution eﬀect may
oﬀset the wage and employment gains obtained by a more competitive product market.
This can be easily grasped by inspecting equation (6). A decrease in h/q raises the
instantaneous utility of the union, equal to wx xlx + (1 − xlx)αY , because wx and
Y go up. However, the rate mx at which a new ﬁrm enters the market increases as
well, making the union more likely to operate in a more competitive market, with lower
rents to be shared.
As far as the change in h/q is concerned, the beneﬁts caused by the increase in
unions’ instantaneous utility prevail. A decrease in entry costs make workers’ unions
better oﬀ for any level of competition. Even unions in which all the members are
are unemployed (operating in sectors with x = 0) beneﬁt from the reduction in h/q,
because the income of the unemployed, αY , is higher.
5.2.2 Lowering workers’ unions bargaining power
I consider a reduction up to 20% in β. As far as the unemployment and the total output
are concerned, squeezing β has the same eﬀects of a reduction in h/q. Figure 5 shows
the evolution of Y and u as β decreases. Even the orders of magnitude appear broadly
similar: a reduction up to 20% of unions’ bargaining power shrinks unemployment
26The Gini index is computed by taking the income of unemployed into account
23Figure 5: Numerical results: a reduction in the bargaining power of workers’ unions,
β. Dotted lines: simulation with β 20% lower.
as much as a decrease by 25% in entry costs. The eﬀects on the average real wage
are almost negligible: diminishing β by 20% raises ¯ w by 1 euro, that corresponds to
a 0.08% increase. This is due to the fact that, besides the positive income and the
negative distribution eﬀect present in the case of lower entry costs, a change in β also
aﬀects the wage equation; from (15), a lower β decreases the wx for any value of x.
The two negative eﬀects basically oﬀset the income eﬀect caused by a lower β.
Inequality
A lower unions’ bargaining power squeezes the wage variance and the Gini index. A
20% reduction of β translates into a decrease in the wage variance of about 68%; the
24size of the decline is identical to that caused by the 25% decrease in entry cost. The
Gini index is also lowered by 50%. The explanations for such a sharp decline are the
same expressed for the case of product marker deregulation. A lower workers’ unions
bargaining power triggers competition that in turn entails a larger share of workers
having the same salary.
Welfare of trade unions
The eﬀects of a reduction in β on the welfare of workers’ unions depend on the level
of competition in the intermediate sector. The sixth graphic in Figure 5 illustrates
that; trade unions operating in a monopoly and in duopoly are worse oﬀ after the
reduction in β, whereas those belonging to sectors with more than one competitor and
the unemployed are better oﬀ. Consider equation (6). As in the case of lower entry
costs, two countervailing forces aﬀect unions’ expected utility. On the one hand, a
lower β raises the instantaneous utility of the union, wx xlx + (1 − xlx)αY , because
both Y and wx are higher. On the other hand, the capital loss due to the increase
in competition augments because of the higher probability a new ﬁrm will enter the
market. Because ﬁrms’ proﬁts are decreasing and convex with respect to x, this second
eﬀect is stronger in sectors with low competition. Labour market deregulation worsens
the welfare of trade unions in poorly competitive industries, even though both the
aggregate real wage and the level of employment go up.
6 Conclusion
In Europe, reforms aimed to improve the functioning of the product and labour markets
are at the centre of the political agenda. This paper does not argue that such changes
must not be undertaken; rather, that the overall consequences for the economy are
more mixed than an analysis uniquely focused on the employment and wage gains
suggests.
Easing the cost for a ﬁrms to enter the market reduces the wage variance and
the Gini index but enlarges the distance between the lowest and the highest pay in
the economy. Labour market deregulation worsens the welfare of workers employed in
markets with low competition, while it raises the utility of all the others; the theoretical
prediction is that these reforms are harder to implement than those concerning the
25functioning of the product market. This would leave room for some political economy
reﬂections that I neglected.
Moreover, the conclusions on wage inequality and the welfare of trade unions have
not been empirically tested. This can be left for future research.
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27Appendix A: Existence of L
By deﬁnition, L is such that mL = 0. Three conditions are suﬃcient for the existence
of L. First, the term in the LHS of (20) is decreasing in x. Second, that it tends to a
negative value as x → +∞. Third, that it is positive at x = 1. If these conditions are
fulﬁlled, there exists only one x = L such that mL = 0 (and the LHS of (20) is equal
to zero).
Ignoring for simplicity the integer problem, the derivative of the ﬁrst term in the LHS
of (20) with respect to x is:
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h












that is negative if dlx/dx is negative. This is the case in a Cournot model in which the
amount of the good produced by each player decreases with the number of competitors.
This can also be checked by diﬀerentiating (14).
Furthermore, limx→+∞
q
h (1 − β)α · Y
lx x
xs−1 − r = −r because in case of perfect
competition (i.e. x → +∞), both Y and Qx = lx · x take positive ﬁnite values.
Finally, evaluating (12) at x = 1 and knowing that JE(x) =
h
















Using the equation of ﬁrms’ revenues 16 and rearranging, one gets:
q
h







The RHS is positive and this proves the third condition.
Appendix B: Existence of the Equilibrium
Before formally proving Proposition 1, I introduce the following Lemma:
Lemma 1 The sum S ≡
 L
x=0 g(x) · πx · I is increasing (decreasing) in mx for
any function g(.) increasing (decreasing) in x.
28It easy to check that dπx
dmn > 0 if n ∈ [0,1,2,....,x − 1], and dπx
dmn < 0 if n ∈


















The ﬁrst term at the RHS is negative, the second one is positive. To check the sign of
this derivative, notice that
 L


































The last inequality is veriﬁed if g(x) is an increasing function.
To prove Proposition 1, I distinguish three case.
CASE 1: s > 2.
Consider the system (24). I write the ﬁrst equation as an implicit relationship in (L,Y )
space:






























2−s · (L − 1) · L
2(s−1)
2−s · (Ls − 1)
1
s−2 < 0. (26)
The implicit function G1(L,Y ) = 0 is decreasing in the (L,Y ) space. I denote
Y = g1(L) the explicit function of G1(L,Y ) = 0. Then, limL→0 g1(L) → +∞ and
limL→+∞ g1(L) = 0.
I also write the second equation as an implicit relationship in (L,Y ) space:














29Figure 6: Equilibrium when s > 2.





















∂ mn · ∂ mn
∂ L . The derivative dmn/dL is positive (see footnote











 s−1 is increasing in x.
The implicit function G2(L,Y ) = 0 is increasing in the (L,Y ) space.
I denote Y = g2(L) the explicit function of G2(L,Y ) = 0. Then, limL→0 g1(L) = 0 and
limL→+∞ g1(L) = k, a positive and ﬁnite number, because limL→+∞
Ls−1
Ls = 1.
Figure 6 illustrates the equilibrium.
CASE 2: s = 2.
If s = 2, Y disappears from G1 = 0, that uniquely deﬁnes the value for L. G1(L) = 0
is a vertical line in the (L,Y ) space. Figure 7 illustrates the equilibrium.
30Figure 7: Equilibrium when s = 2.
CASE 3: 1 < s < 2.
In this case, the derivative (26) is positive and G1(L,Y ) = 0 is increasing in the (L,Y )
space. Moreover, limL→0 g1(L) = 0 and limL→+∞ g1(L) → +∞.
Since G2(L,Y ) = 0 is also veriﬁed at the origin, the point (0,0) is one equilibrium
solution of the system.
Moreover, at L → +∞, g1(L) > g2(L) = k. So, if I show that in the interval L ∈ [0,1]
g1(L) < g2(L), the system admits at least another equilibrium, in which the function
g1(L) intersects the function g2(L) from below. See Figure 8.
To prove this last point, I evaluates the derivatives in (26) and (28) at L = 0 and
L = 1. It is easy to see that g′
1(0) = g′
2(0) = 0 and g′














So, in the interval L ∈ [0,1], the function g1(L) coincides with the horizontal axis and
for L ∈ (1,+∞) becomes upward sloping. On the other hand, g2(L) is increasing for
L ∈ (0,+∞). The function g1(L) intersects g2(L) in the positive hortant at least once.
31Figure 8: Equilibria when 1 < s < 2.
Appendix C: Comparative Statics
CASE 1: s > 2.
Eﬀects on L and Y
I consider the system composed by equations (25) and (27) and summarize the deriva-





























x · s − 1
x · s





= (s − 1) · Y
s−2 > 0.
(29)
Moreover, it is easy to check that ∂ G1/∂ h < 0, ∂ G2/∂ h = 0, whereas ∂ G1/∂ β < 0,
and ∂ G2/∂ β = 0.











































































































I now evaluate the eﬀects on the aggregate level of employment of a change in h or β.




x · lx · πx · I
= Y























(by using equation 23).
(30)
The level of employment is a function of the endogenous variable L. Since L decreases
with h or β, it remains to show the eﬀect of L on E.
To simplify the notations, I denote fx ≡
xs−1













1 + ... + fL · a′
L) · (a1 + ... + aL) − (a′
1 + ... + a′
L) · (f1 · a1 + ... + fL · aL)
(a1 + a2 + ... + aL)2
At the numerator, the terms fx ·a′
x ·ax cancel out. The numerator can be re-expressed









x · ax+k) · (fx+k − fx) (31)
The term fx+k − fx is positive ∀x ∈ [1,...,L] and ∀k ∈ [1,...,L − x] because fx is
increasing in x.
Consider now the term ax · a′
x+k − a′




























dL . From equation (3), πx+k = g(mx+k−1,mx+k−2,...,mx+1) · πx with g(.)





x · πx+k = πx · [g
′(.) · πx + g(.) · π
′
x ] − π
′





27For instance, π2 = m1







∂ mn · ∂ mn
∂ L is positive.
Then, the numerator (31) is positive and dE/dL is positive. An increase in h or β
reduces the aggregate level of employment via a decrease in L.
Eﬀects on the real wage
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x · s − 1
.
Since dY/dβ < 0, the eﬀect of β on wx cannot be ascertained.
CASE 2: s = 2.
The only diﬀerence with respect to the case s > 2 is that ∂ G1/∂ Y = 0. It easy to




dβ is the same as in the case
s > 2. The eﬀect of L on E does not change too.
CASE 3: 1 < s < 2.



















Two scenarios are possible. In the equilibrium points in which g1(L) intersects g2(L)
from below (like the positive one in Figure 8), g′
1(L) > g′
2(L). From the formula
of the implicit function theorem, this is equivalent to say that the denominator (32)
is negative. Then, the eﬀects of β and h on L, Y , the real wage, and the level of
employment have the same sign as in s ≥ 2.
In Appendix B I proved that at least one equilibrium of this kind exists. But I cannot
rule out the existence of equilibria in which in which g1(L) intersects g2(L) from above,
g′
1(L) < g′
2(L), and the denominator (32) is positive. It is easy to see that under this
scenario an increase in β and h raises L and Y and have a positive impact on the real
wage and the level of employment.
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